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Terror and Terrorism: There is a Difference
DAVID F. FORTE*
I.
When American F-11 fighter bombers delivered their ordnance
to military and terrorist training targets in Libya, they were not merely
attacking Libya militarily. They were defending the international legal
order by helping to refine what had become a muddied principle of
international law. Of course, the initial dismay of the allies, save one;
the predictable denunciations from the enemies of the West; and the
guarded and sometimes grudging approval of the American press ob-
scured what had been done. Nevertheless, diplomacy is the primary
means of enforcing the international legal order, and force but an
adjunct. If the Administration can correct the ill effects of its secret
negotiations with Iran, the salutary effect of the American military
response against Libya may yet bear fruit, for that raid began to
resolve the confusion between acts of terror and acts of terrorism,
and the appropriate legal response to each.'
Consider the following.
- In April, 1986, in Los Angeles, Richard Ramirez was charged
with fourteen murders, five attempted murders, seven rapes, fifteen
other sexual offenses-three with children-two kidnappings, nineteen
burglaries, and six robberies. Ramirez was thought to be the notor-
ious "Night Stalker," a man "whose reign of crime spread terror across
Southern California for six months," the Associated Press reported.2
With that type of incident, terror was the apt description.
- During World War II, allied forces bombed Dresden and many
Japanese cities with incendiaries. The resulting firestorms killed thous-
ands of civilians. Allegedly, the attacks were accomplished for the
purpose of terrorizing the populace in order to hamper the enemy's
war effort, and to place pressure on the enemy political leadership
* Formerly Counselor for Legal Affairs, United States Mission to the United Na-
tions; Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Cleveland State Uni-
versity College of Law; A.B., Harvard; M.A., University of Manchester; Ph.D., University
of Toronto; J.D., Columbia University. The research leading to this article was sup-
ported by a grant from the Cleveland-Marshall Fund. My colleague, Professor Joel Finer,
assisted me by his commentary. I am also grateful for the research assistance of Janet
Payton, law student, and Judith Kaul, Reference/Media Librarian, Cleveland-Marshall
College of Law. The conclusions herein are my own.
1. See, e.g., the diplomatic success of the United States at the Tokyo Summit. 7
Summit Leaders Condemn Terror, Citing Libyan Role, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1986, at 1,
col. 6.
2. Chilling Courtroom Drama Unfolds In Night Stalker Case, Associated Press
(available Apr. 21, 1986 on NEXIS, File: WIRES).
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to end the conflict.3
- In October, 1983, over two hundred and fifty U.S. Marines
were killed in their barracks in Beirut by a solo suicide attacker In a
truck filled with explosives. President Reagan later declared: "Every
effort will be made to find the criminals responsible for this act of
terrorism so this despicable act will not go unpunished."
- In October, 1985, Palestinian gunmen seized an Italian cruise
ship, the Achille Lauro. They killed an American who was confined
to a wheelchair. Later, the perpetrators were apprehended when the
Egyptian aircraft, that was transporting them to Tunis, was diverted
by the United States to Sicily. Their leader, however, escaped prosecu-
tion.5
- In March, 1978, former Italian Premier Aldo Moro was kid-
napped by members of terrorist Red Brigade. They later shot Moro
after the Italian government refused his abductors' demands to free
a number of jailed terrorists. 6
- In late 1985, Senator Bill Bradley (D., New Jersey) condemn-
ed the carpet bombing of Afghan villages by Soviet bombers and gun-
ships. He declared: "The genocide in Afghanistan is one more appal-
ling episode in a historical pattern of Soviet terror, and the world
must now forcefully oppose it."
7
- A number of protesters to American aid for the Nicaraguan
armed opposition, the Contras, have asserted that Contra soldiers
engage in terroristic acts against the Nicaraguan civilian populace.8
- An entire period of the French Revolution is known as 'The
Terror," a term used by the Terror's own leaders and by subsequent
historians. 9 A similar label is attached to the Stalinist era in the Soviet
Union.10
- The common law knows of "in terrorem" clauses, which are
3. D. IRVING, THE DESTRUCTION OF DRESDEN (1963).
4. President Reagan, remarks and questions-and-answer sessions made to regional
editors and broadcasters, White House, Oct. 24, 1983. Excerpts published in 83 DEFPT
OF STATE BULL. 41 (Dec. 1983).
5. Walcott, You Can Run But You Cant Hide, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 21, 1985, at
22.
6. Terror Gangs; Is Anyone Safe?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 22, 1978, at
30.
7. Bradley, Captive Afghanistan, 6 Years Later; Fighters Need U.S. Aid, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 27, 1985, at A31, col. 2.
8. Demonstrators Urge No Aid to Contras as House Prepares to Reconsider,
Associated Press (available Apr. 15, 1986 on NEXIS, file: WIRES); Washington Dateline,
Associated Press (available May 19, 1986 on NEXIS, file: WIRES).
9. R. PALMER, TWELVE WHO RULED: THE YEAR OF THE TERROR IN THE FRENCH
REVOLUTION (1941).
10. B. LEVYTSKY, THE STALINIST TERROR IN THE THIRTIES: DOCUMENTATION
FROM THE SOVIET PRESS (1974).
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unenforceable provisions in contracts or wills designed to compel ad-
herence to the terms of the document by fear of serious financial
reprisal." "In terrorem populi" was a common-law criminal offense
defined as going about armed despite the absence of riot or violence.' 2
On the other hand, the law has approved the in terrorem principle
as a legitimate basis for punishments for crime or contempt.' 3
II.
It is clear that all acts of terror seek to inspire dread and to
paralyze the will of the immediate or ultimate victim to resist the
objectives of the perpetrator. 4 It is also clear, however, that some
acts of terror are legitimate, while those that are not legitimate can
be illegal under differing legal structures. Legitimate legal penalties
such as imprisonment or death can inspire terror, as can justifiable
military actions in war directed at enemy armed forces and designed
to demoralize them. Even suicide missions against an armed force
can be legitimate. For example, except for the fact that the driver of
the truck bomb did not wear an insignia identifying him as an armed
insurgent, his attack against the Marine barracks in Beirut was pro-
bably not illegal under international law since the Marines were dis-
patched into a civil war and insurgency situation.
Illegal acts of terror are another matter. Those acts of terror
that are contrary to law are so under differing legal regimes. Munici-
pal law proscribes and punishes individual acts of terror. The laws
of war regulate others. Certain customary and treaty norms deal with
other kinds of state-imputed acts of terror. Yet what has confused
lawmakers, what has carried policy makers to rhetorical excess, and
what has frustrated the American people, has been the failure to
distinguish the different kinds of acts of terror, the different levels of
culpability they incur, and the different forms of appropriate legal
response.
The attempt to homogenize acts of terror and to universalize
penalties attached to them has resulted in a burst of legislative and
prescriptive activity that has only served to confuse and often to
dilute the response to terror. A recent study on terrorism listed eleven
definitions of terrorism put forward by the executive and legislative
branches, and by some states.'5 There are, at this writing, forty-six
bills pending in Congress dealing directly with terrorism.16
11. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 735 (5th ed. 1979).
12. State v. Shepherd, 177 Mo. 205, 228, 76 S.W. 79, - (1903).
13. Commonwealth v. Runnels, 10 Mass. 518, 520 (1812).
14. R. FRIEDLANDER, TERROR-VIOLENCE: ASPECTS OF SOCIAL CONTROL (1983).
15. R. S. CLINE & Y. ALEXANDER, TERRORISM AS STATE-SPONSORED COVERT
WARFARE 21 (1986).
16. Available on LEXIS/NEXIS terminal, Library. REFSRV; File: BLCAST; Search
Request: Terror! (Sept. 29, 1986).
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The problem is that-legislatively and historically-we have often
tried to deal with acts of terror as if they were neutral, fungible, and
universal evils. They are not. Certain acts of terror, whether commit-
ted by robbers, rapists, or even soldiers, are individualized evils, and
can be criminalized as such. But much of terror today is more than
that. Terror has become a practice. It has truly become terrorism,
the systematic and primary use of randomly focused violence by organ-
ized groups against civilian targets to effectuate a political objective.17
Modern terrorism is more than a neutral evil. It has a particular po-
litical and moral content. 8 It is the difference between terror and
terrorism that we must examine.
Bluntly put, the target of the modern terrorist is the Western
legal system and its human rights underpinnings. Laws that treat all
acts of terror as indistinguishable fail to focus on the peculiar evil
that these acts of terrorism represent. If we deal with the modern
terrorist solely by means of legal principles that lump him in with
other agents who may commit acts of culpable or even of legitimate
terror, we shall have constrained the justifiable use of force against
groups that may be truly at war with the United States and its allies
throughout the world. More importantly, the idea of universalizing
the condemnation of acts of terror serves to undercut the significant
moral distinction between those who commit one or more acts of
terror and those. who do so in a programmatic fashion. Long ago,
Aristotle noted the moral distinction between one who commits an
unjust act, and one who acts unjustly. 9 That distinction applies to
terrorists as well.
III.
Let us look at the problem from the perspective of international
law and how it treats and responds to organized groups whose acts
of violence include terror. Basically, there are three kinds of these
groups: formal armed forces, organized partisan units, and the clas-
sic modern terrorist movement.
In the first category are armies. By definition, armies are arms
of the state, and, consequently, their action is imputed back to the
state. Accordingly it is the state which bears the ultimate responsibil-
ity for any illegal excess committed by its armed forces. Through the
1949 Geneva Conventions, international law essentially protects non-
combatants 0 and prisoners of war 21 from direct attack or intentional
17. R. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 14, at 21.
18. Address by Secretary of State Shultz, Park Avenue Synagogue, New York City,
Oct. 25, 1984. Terrorism and the Modern World, 84 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 12 (Dec.
1984).
19. ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Section VI, 187 (1134a 6-23) (J. Thom-
son trans. 1980).
20. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 29, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3538, T.I.A.S. No. 3365.
21. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
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harm. On the whole, organized armies observe these rules. Yet, every
army sometime or other, in some conflict, has units or soldiers break-
ing these rules. For example, in general, the Geneva Convention to
protect prisoners of war was observed during World War II by the
West and by Germany. However, it was egregiously violated by the
Soviet Union and Japan. Further, the requirement not to attack civ-
ilians was again mostly observed by the West, with some exceptions
mainly arising from aerial bombardment. On the other hand, this re-
quirement was seriously violated by the Soviet Union and Japan, and
was systematically and intentionally violated by Germany.
World War II demonstrates that all armies at war have on occa-
sion used actions that were designed to cause terror among civilians.
Nonetheless, we would not term Great Britain or the United States a
terrorist state in the sense that it uses terror as a primary and sys-
tematic means for political maintenance of internal power and of
external influence. On the other hand, the Third Reich, the Soviet
Union and Mao's China have all used terror as a primary means of
internal control and external expansion. Therefore, we are permitted
to make a rational and moral judgment as to whether a state is
generally observant of the proper rules of international conflict, de-
spite some failings, or whether the state systematically or recklessly
disregarded those rules, in which case we can impute to the state an
enmity to the values underlying those rules. This is central to our
understanding of and dealing with, such wrongs. We know from his-
tory that the Soviet Union has a fundamental animosity and anti-
pathy to those human rights values that are codified in the Geneva
Conventions protecting civilians and prisoners of war. We know that
the United States and Great Britain, though their armies at times
have violated these rules, stand on a different moral posture.
What are the remedies for terroristic violations of the laws of
war? As in most issues dealing with international law, the most com-
mon remedy is diplomacy. Repeated protests, incessant reaffirmations,
and confirmatory actions can assist in creating a diplomatic atmos-
phere where the proper practice of the rules of war can become
habitual. For example, after a brief and unfortunate hesitation, the
United States has clearly let Iraq know that the use of chemical
agents in its war with Iran is unacceptable and illegal.2 2 Further, the
United States has apparently done what it can to try to prevent Iraq
from being able to obtain and to use such agents. Allied to diplo-
macy, publicity is another means for attempting to make sure states
observe the rules of war.
A further mechanism for enforcement is internal discipline. A
state is required through its own municipal law to punish those of
1949, art. 12, para. 1, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3328, T.I.A.S. No. 3364.
22. U.S. Fears Iran May Use Chemical Arms, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1985, at A3,
col. 4.
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its soldiers who have violated the proper rules of war.2 3 Beyond these
mechanisms lie other means of relief. At a more serious level of en-
forcement, the victim state may engage in permissible acts of retalia-
tion such as the responsive use of chemical agents.2 4 Finally, in the
most extreme situations, a systematic practice of attacking civilian
populations may engender a charge of committing a crime against
humanity, thus permitting trials such as those that took place at
Nuremberg. 25
A second kind of group which may engage in acts of terror are
organized partisans. These are traditionally resistance groups operat-
ing within an occupied territory. Partisans enjoy the same rights and
are obligated by the same rules of international warfare as are organ-
ized armies. They must carry some external sign of their combat sta-
tus, and they must treat prisoners and civilians in a humane way.
During World War II, such partisans attacked military targets, but
they also shot informers and collaborators and they could not, of
course, take prisoners. The remedy for such excesses usually lies in
the hands of the military force engaged in occupation duty. Organ-
ized partisan units are supposed to be accorded prisoner of war pro-
tections, but in fact they usually are not. If found out of uniform, by
informers or by other means, they can legitimately be tried and shot.
Internal discipline, though available, is more problematical. There is
no example I can think of where a partisan unit, such as the French
Maquis, for example, was disciplined by the returning political power
for whom they had fought.
We can now see that in these first two examples of excesses by
organized military units, the remedies are usually found in diplomacy,
or internal discipine, or retaliation by the offended party.
Let us now turn to the classic terrorist as we have known him
in the last two decades. Generally speaking, there is no external sign
showing him to be part of a partisan military unit. His objectives
include attacks on soldiers, political leaders, and those who cooper-
ate with the government. But his primary objective is to attack civ-
ilians in order to terrorize and cripple the will of the target govern-
ment. The most appropriate remedy for dealing with terrorists is to
treat them for what they are-as criminals who violate municipal
23. First Lieutenant William Laws Calley, Jr., was convicted on March 29, 1971
of murdering unarmed Vietnamese civilians during the Vietnam War, in violation of
Article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. See R. HAMMER, THE COURT-
MARTIAL OF LT. CALLEY (1971).
24. Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating Poisonous or Other Gases,
and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No.
8061. (Reservations added. Protocol ratified December 16, 1974 with reservation entered
into force for the United States on April 10, 1974.)
25. See G. F, A. BEST, NUREMBERG AND AFTER: THE CONTINUING HISTORY OF
WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (1984).
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law. 26 Most Western states utilize their domestic legal methods to cap-
ture, prosecute and punish terrorists. What we have found in the
last twenty years, however, is that the ordinary criminal processes of
Western states are inadequate to deal with the international charac-
ter of terrorism as it has come to be. Consequently, four remedies
are employed to polish the criminal law so that it can effectively
deal with the terrorist, and at the same time, treat him as a criminal.
The first remedy is to try to perfect the extradition mechanism
between states. This has been evidenced in a number of Conventions,
such as the European Convention on Terrorism,2 and the Montreal, 28
Hague,29 and Hostage Taking Conventions. 30 At the same time, it has
led to a movement to try to limit the political offense exception to
extradition so that these types of politically violent acts cannot escape
criminal prosecution. The most prominent example is the renegotiated
extradition treaty between the United States and Great Britain.3
The second attempted remedy has been to try to institutionalize
pressure on those states that are reluctant to deal with these terror-
ists as criminals within their own legal systems. This objective led to
the Tokyo,32, Montreal,33 Hague,34 and Hostage Taking Conventions.3 5
The latter three, of course, declare that if a terrorist is found within
one of the signatory states, that state must subject him to its crimi-
nal processes, or extradite him to another state otherwise having jur-
isdiction over him.36
The third method of dealing with terrorists as criminals has been
to expand domestic jurisdiction. The United States has enacted a num-
ber of pieces of legislation extending extraterritorial jurisdiction over
26. R. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 14, at 72.
27. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Council of Europe,
Nov. 10, 1976, reprinted in R. FRIEDLANDER, 2 TERRORISM DOCUMENTS OF INTER-
NATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL 565 (1979).
28. Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Action (Sabotage),
Sept. 23, 1971, art. 8, 24 U.S.T. 565, 571, T.I.A.S. No. 7570 [hereinafter Montreal Con-
vention].
29. Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), Dec. 16, 1970, art. 8,
22 U.S.T. 1641, 1646-47, T.I.A.S. No. 7192 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
30. U.N. Doc. A/C.6/34/L.23, art. 10, 1460-61.
31. Supplementary Extradition Treaty Between the United States and the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Hearings Before the Subcommittee
on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1985).
32. Aviation: Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept.
14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219.
33. Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage),
Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570.
34. Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), Dec. 16, 1970, 22
U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192.
35. U.N. Doc. A/C.6/34/L.23.
36. Montreal Convention, supra note 28, art. 7 at 571. Hague Convention, supra
note 29, art. 7 at 1646. Hostage Taking Convention, supra note 30, U.N. Doc. A/C.
6/34/L.23, art. 8 at 1460.
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hostage-taking acts, and terrorist acts on airplanes.37 Recent Senate
debate called for the Attorney General to reach beyond the country's
border to deal with those who murder American citizens anywhere
in the world.3 8
The fourth level has been to try to define terrorism as a form of
universal criminality whereby every state in the world may capture
and try terrorists.3 9 The extent to which the permission to capture
terrorists includes intervening in the territory of jurisdiction of other
states is a proposition hotly debated. Although Senator Specter sup-
ports this proposition, Judge Sofaer, the State Department's Legal
Adviser, has declared that certain kinds of Eichmann-like apprehen-
sions might be contrary to international law.4 0
All of these actions have been beneficial. We have to make good
our view that the terrorist is fundamentally a criminal. But in facing
the political facts, it is evident that these reforms have been directed
more at the symptoms or results of modern terrorism rather than at
its causes. Even if successful, all that these legislative enactments will
do is give a wider range of enforcement jurisdiction over the terror-
ist once he is captured, or they will give greater permission for a
pursuing state to capture him. Removing the cause of terrorism is
another issue. Finding the cause of terrorism is another issue. How-
ever, I do not mean to use the words, "the cause of terrorism" in the
sense often heard in the United Nations, where assertions are voiced
that Zionism, apartheid, and colonialism are the primary causes of
terrorism. No, the cause of modern terrorism can be seen in itself,
not in its exculpatory rhetoric.
IV.
Modern terrorism has a particular and consistent character. In
terms of the means used by terrorists, in terms of the objective of
terrorism, and in terms of the ideology of terrorism, there is one
undeviating constant. It is the systematic use of totalitarian force.
Terrorism, whether Lenin practiced it from the seat of government,
or whether somebody with a bomb practices it on an airplane, is the
same. It is designed to paralyze the ordinary daily lives of everyday
people; it is designed to make them vulnerable and malleable within
the hands of an outside power; it is designed, in other words, to
37. Hostage-Taking Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 1203 (Law. Co-op. 1984 & Supp. 1986);
Aircraft Sabotage Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 32 (Law. Co-op. 1984).
38. See, e.g., remarks of Sen. Lautenberg, 132 CONG. REC. S1428-29 (daily ed.
Feb. 19, 1986).
39. See Address by President Reagan before the American Bar Association, Wash-
ington, D.C., July 8, 1985. The New Network of Terrorist States, 85 DEP'T OF STATE
BULL. 7 (Aug. 1985).
40. Gwerztman, Shultz Backs "'Moderate Force' Against Terrorists, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 14, 1986, at AS, col. 4; Specter, How to Make Terrorists Think Twice, N.Y. Times,
May 22, 1986, at A31, col. 1.
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make them totally at the mercy of him who wields the force. In
short, terrorism is totalitarianism on the cheap. Consequently, we
make an error if we attempt to deal with terrorism solely on the
basis of expanding the mechanism of criminal enforcement. This is
because terrorism is not merely a politically violent form of criminal-
ity. Terrorism today is one aspect in an actual shooting war against
the West.
Terrorist groups and their direct state sponsors are independent
actors with independent moral and legal responsibility for their acts.
Yet, a fundamental anti-Western ideological stance permeates virtu-
ally all of them. It is significant that most thorough analyses have
shown that when it comes to terrorist actions, virtually all roads even-
tually wind their way back to Moscow, not necessarily in terms of
direct control, but in terms of support, training, or of ideological com-
patibility.41 Whether it be through the Bulgarians, the North Koreans,
the Nicaraguans, the Cubans, the Syrians, or the Libyans, the Soviet
Union maintains a constant supply of arms, training and encourage-
ment to terrorist groups who act against Western institutions. There
is a conscious alliance of ideology and opportunity, in many cases an
alliance only of convenience, using this mechanism to wage war. But
there is an alliance.
Let us take a frank look at the bipolar struggle and the terrorist
component so that we neither underestimate nor exaggerate the
Soviet role. In its rivalry of and enmity to the West, the Soviet Union
is attempting either to discredit, undermine, or simply overwhelm
those aspects of Western resolve, Western economy, and Western mil-
itary policy, but at low risk to the Soviet Union. One does not have
to be apocalyptic to acknowledge the fact that Soviet competition
with the West has reached an armed combat stage at certain local-
ized points. The U.S.S.R. much prefers proxies or allies when battle
must be joined, and it much prefers a conventional military solution
over any other. Its massive aid to Nicaragua, Vietnam, Ethiopia, and
Angola, and its own strategy in Afghanistan, are designed to over-
whelm resistance groups by the application of large conventional for-
ces and weaponry. Last year offensives in Cambodia, Nicaragua and
Angola were all designed to defeat the insurgencies there before Amer-
ican aid could reach the rebels.
There are two other military options available besides the con-
ventional: nuclear and terrorist. Because of its emphasis on conven-
tional arms, the Soviet Union does not favor a nuclear confrontation,
and would certainly oppose nuclear adventurism by any terrorist-sup-
porting state. Nonetheless, even at the upper extreme of weaponry,
the U.S.S.R. seeks nuclear superiority for obvious political objectives.
At the lower level (where we are concerned in this article), the Soviet
41. Casey, The International Linkages-What Do We Know?, in U. RA'ANAN,
HYDRA OF CARNAGE 5 (1986).
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Union assists and encourages guerrilla and terroristic groups attack-
ing the West. Here too it uses proxies, but with a lesser degree of
tactical and political control than even that which it can wield in a
conventional war situation.
The proxies, whether they be states or terror groups themselves,
operate tactically with much freedom to maneuver. There is an inde-
pendent act of will. They bear consequent responsibility for acts of
terrorism. Thus, in terms of morality, legality, and political prudence,
it is perfectly justifiable to deal with these intermediate groups and
their state sponsors directly, even if political requirements limit effec-
tive response against the Soviet Union.
But how should we do so? Because of this very real military and
political context of terrorism, our response is inadequate if we con-
sider it solely in the terms of traditional or even expanded criminal-
ity. No, rather we must look at these acts as they are: the use of
military force by the state that harbors, equips, and dispatches the
terrorist. Consequently, our response to the state that uses terrorists
must be at the same level that we would respond to a state that
otherwise breaks the rules of war. We may try to use diplomacy, we
may try publicity, but in the end we must be willing to use those
means, whether they be economic or military, that every state retains
in a combat situation where the offending state has broken the rules
of war. Specifically, those means are retorsion, retaliation, selfdefense,
and protection of one's nationals, all of which allow a different vari-
ation on the proper use of force or of economic reprisal. We do our-
selves no service by constantly passing laws against the individual
terrorist when we fail to take legally appropriate executive action in
opposing the state that employs an illegal use of armed force against
us. It is for that reason that the raid on Libya was an act vital to
the integrity of international law.
V.
Until the raid on Libya, factors associated with the problem of
terrorism conspired, and still conspire, to frustrate opportunities to
deal with these states in a normal manner permitted by international
law. The first of these factors has been alluded to above. The very
success in passing conventions, laws and resolutions against terror-
ism led many to ignore the different legal options already available.
The common thread of all these conventions, domestic laws, and
United Nations resolutions, is that the terrorist is a fungible evil. The
theory is that an act of terror allegedly done by a soldier who was
fighting in the Contra army, a village bombing by Soviet gunships in
Afghanistan, and a terrorist attack on passengers at the Rome air-
port are no different.
Now, in a moral sense, it is true that acts of terror are fungible.
The soldier in a partisan army that shoots a civilian to cow a village
into submission is no less culpable for his acts than the terrorist
[Vol. 13
TERROR AND TERRORISM
that sets a bomb in downtown Belfast. But by passing laws that treat
all terrorists' actions as the same everywhere we lose the legitimate
distinction between dealing with certain acts violative of the laws of
war and certain acts that are individually criminal. There are reme-
dies-as badly enforced as they are-in international law and the
rules of war that should be used against the individual soldier who
terrorizes a civilian. The criminal remedies we have fashioned for
non-uniformed civilians acting as terrorists should be directed at
them. Indeed, those individuals that engage in terrorism, that is, in
an organized and ongoing practice of violent intimidation of civilians
should be treated as universal criminals. However, the remedies di-
rected at a state that engages in terrorism as a policy are on a dif-
ferent legal plane. If the terroristic act is a basic part of a state pol-
icy towards other states, we do not have a problem of mere individual
criminality nor simply of universal criminality. We have instead a pro-
blem of a violation of the international law regarding the legitimate
use of force between states.42
A second factor that has frustrated opportunities to deal with
terror-sponsoring states is that the movement to universalize the laws
against terrorism tends to confirm the philosophical problem of what
has come to be known as moral equivalence. One of the faults of
part of the political cognoscenti in this country has been to presume
that an action done by the Soviet Union and similar action done by
the United States are ipso facto of the same moral equivalent. Even
criticisms of the Soviet Union's actions in Afghanistan are sometimes
stated as being comparable to the United States' role in Vietnam, as
if U.S. actions provide the standard of evil from which we can judge
Soviet actions. 43 In point of fact, as I have stated above, the state-
sponsored terrorist's act of blowing up the airports in Vienna or Rome,
and the individual soldier's excessive action are of different legal
orders. The terrorism in Vienna and Rome is an essential part of the
entire program of a political entity. Ultimately, there is a moral dif-
ference between a culpable and condemnable action in a war and
culpable terroristic action that is essentially part of a political pro-
gram. The fact that we have tried to universalize the attitude toward
terroristic acts anywhere makes us lose the moral distinction between
what is essentially evil and what is, in an Aristotelian sense, inciden-
tally evil. That being the case, today we have criticisms of the Con-
tras because some of the Contras have apparently at sometime or
another committed acts that were terroristic in nature, as if these
Contras are no different from the Khaddafi or Khomeini terrorists
that we are trying to deal with elsewhere in the world. This confuses
necessary distinctions that must be made in order to choose a policy
42. See Address by President Reagan, supra note 39.
43. Lewis, Abroad at Home: In the Afghan Tunnel, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1980, at
A23, col. 5.
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that is both effective and moral in a world of imperfect political
actors.
The third factor that has undermined an effective response to
state terrorism has been the relatively successful attempt in interna-
tional forums to legitimize those terroristic excesses done by civilians
when done for a particular cause. The view. of the West should be
that all acts of terror are culpable, although they may be culpable in
different contexts-under domestic criminality, or under universal crim-
inality, or under the laws of war-and they may have different inten-
sities of evil to be judged when making unavoidable political choices.
However, what the Marxists and their allies in the United Nations
have done is to reverse logic by treating the particular form of vio-
lence that we know of as modern terrorism as legitimate, and treat-
ing the counteractions of those states defending themselves as illegit-
imate.
Those "national liberation movements" that are favored are seen
to be legitimized by a most peculiar notion of self-determination. The
original concept of self-determination signified an ongoing process of
governmental accountability to its people. The new concept of self-
determination allows terroristic groups of a certain favored ilk to use
their own means to accomplish a particular political end-that end
having very little to do with the ultimate political will of the people,
and still less to do with the accountability of the governments that
come to power as the result of the success of these national libera-
tion movements. Consequently, an attempt at retaliation against a
state, or even an attempt at retaliation against a group itself that is
favored by the United Nations under this rubric, runs into two prob-
lems. First, the retaliation is said to be invalid because it is being
used against a group whose struggle is defined as legitimate and
whose means are defined as acceptable. Secondly, any excesses that
may occur in a state's attempting to counteract terrorism, whether
these excesses be by Israel or South Africa or a Western state, are
then condemned as being terroristic themselves. All the resolutions
condemning the universal nature of terrorism then apply to those
states seeking to defend themselves.
In 1985, for example, Israel attacked the PLO headquarters in
Tunis in response to a PLO-sponsored terroristic attack in Cyprus
against three Israelis. In my view, retaliation against such a group
being succored and given sanctuary by a state is legitimate so long
as the retaliation is as surgical as possible and does not involve the
military forces of the host state which were not involved in the ter-
roristic act to begin with. Israel made an error in its attack in Tunis.
On political grounds, Israel erred in that it attacked the PLO in a
state that has been consistently moderate and consistently aligned
with the West. In addition, Israel may not have used proportionate
force; but if it did not use proportionate force, the error was only
marginal. What did the United Nations do? The Security Council
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vehemently condemned Israel's action as being aggression. 44 The term
aggression has major legal implications, permitting the Security Coun-
cil to assume Chapter VII jurisdiction, as it did during the Korean
conflict, and thereby to authorize military force against the aggressor
and to take other mandatory legal actions. Thus, even in cases where
a response to terrorism may have been disproportionate, the response
of the United Nations has often been to exaggerate the delictual re-
sponsibility of the retaliating state.
VI.
CONCLUSION
To formulate an effective legal and moral response to terrorism,
fundamental differences must be acknowledged. We must realize that
all acts of terror are not legally interchangeable. We should not create
legal instruments that confound essential dissimilarities. We should
acknowledge that terrorism is an organized, low level attack by groups
trying to destroy the Western legal and moral order. We should rec-
ognize that many such terrorist groups have been given purported
legitimacy by a distorted notion of self-determination and by recogni-
tion within many international bodies. Also, we should face the fact
that the effectiveness of terrorism is immeasurably enhanced by indi-
rect and direct assistance from the Soviet Union, Cuba, North Korea,
Syria and others.
To erect an order that can withstand such an attack, all appropri-
ate and legitimate legal resources should be employed. First, individ-
ual acts of terror, by whomsoever committed, should be punished,
first of all, by municipal criminal legislation. This municipal law should
be strengthened by conventions and treaties requiring prosecution or
extradition. Second, in addition to individual culpability fastened on
soldiers who commit acts of terror, all legitimate responses in inter-
national law should be employed by and against the responsible state,
including protest, diplomacy, and disciplinary mechanisms. Where the
responsible state actually sponsors such actions, retorsion and repri-
sal should be considered, particularly when a sponsoring state, such
as Libya, has egregiously violated the laws of war. Third, the United
States should never accept, expressly or impliedly, any of the legal
and political mechanisms of the United Nations, or other bodies, that
legitimize terroristic groups. Finally, in treating those groups in and
of themselves and apart from the legal responsibility of their state
sponsors, the United States should concretize the emerging norm of
hostis humanis generis, that is, the universal criminality of those
groups whose acts of terror are primary, habitual, and essential to
their political program. These groups have become overt enemies of
the political, moral and legal integrity of our world order. They should
be recognized as such.
44. U.N. Doc. S/Res/573 (1985).
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